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
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Top Secret**FRANCE: Mitterrand Previews Summit Positions**

President Mitterrand's speech on Monday to OECD Ministers contained a preview of French positions at both the Williamsburg Summit and the EC Council meeting in June. []

Mitterrand built the speech around a proposal that consideration be given to establishing an international monetary arrangement within the framework of the IMF to replace the defunct Bretton Woods agreement. He repeated his familiar themes of the need for economic growth and sustained efforts by the industrialized countries to assist the developing countries. The President also rejected economic autarky and protectionism and, while acknowledging the EC's shortcomings, spoke approvingly of the Community. []

The President twice appeared to question the usefulness of summits. He hinted that future French participation might depend in part on the reception his views receive at Williamsburg and at the EC Council meeting. []

Although US economic policies again have become a favored scapegoat for France's economic ills, Mitterrand made no specific criticism of the US. []

Comment: Mitterrand clearly intended his presentation to strengthen his image as an international statesman. Throughout his remarks, however, he appeared to want to avoid the impression of giving ultimatums. He stressed that his proposal for an international monetary conference would require careful preparation, suggesting that the process would take several years. []

The President probably would not boycott future summits, because such a move could seriously damage France's relations with its closest allies. Moreover, he has pitted his personal prestige against those on the left who favor greater protectionism and diminished ties to Europe. []

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USSR-LEBANON: More Soviets Reportedly Depart

Western and Lebanese news agencies, citing officials at the Beirut airport, report that some 25 dependents of Soviet Embassy personnel left for Moscow yesterday on an Aeroflot flight. About 90 dependents had left on Monday. Contrary to the Soviet Ambassador's public claim on Tuesday that the dependents were returning for summer vacation, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official told a US Embassy officer in Moscow yesterday that concern for the dependents' safety was the sole reason for the move. The official asserted, however, that this did not imply that Moscow expects major hostilities. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Although the press reports of the departures yesterday have not been confirmed, they will increase speculation about Soviet motives and heighten anxiety in both the Lebanese and Israeli Governments. The comments of the Foreign Ministry official presumably are designed to deflect criticism that the USSR staged the departure to increase tensions in Lebanon. [REDACTED]

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USSR: Sakharov's Status

Soviet authorities evidently have had second thoughts about permitting the emigration of dissident physicist Andrey Sakharov, who led the USSR's development of hydrogen bombs after World War II. TASS reported yesterday that he cannot leave because he possesses "especially important state and military secrets." Sakharov had been considering emigration offers from Norway and Austria, and last month the Minister of Justice told an interviewer in Sweden that Sakharov could leave. Ministry officials later backtracked, however, saying that emigration matters are not their responsibility. [redacted]

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Comment: Sakharov's military information is totally obsolete. Nonetheless, many Soviets would view his departure as harmful to the USSR's image abroad. The physicist seems to be a special case. Two other well-known dissidents, who have had no access to high technology, have been given their visas and told to leave this month. [redacted]

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SOUTH AFRICA: Parliamentary Byelection Results

The victories by the ruling National Party in two of three parliamentary byelections on Tuesday will give impetus to Prime Minister Botha's proposed constitutional reforms that would grant limited political rights to Coloreds and Indians. Conservative Party leader Treurnicht scored an impressive victory, but his chief lieutenant failed to unseat Manpower Minister Fanie Botha. In a provincial byelection, the National Party won by only a plurality over the Conservatives and the extreme rightwing Herstigte Nasionale Party. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The Prime Minister probably will now move quickly to push his proposed reforms through the parliament, where the National Party retains a clear majority. Despite press reports to the contrary, Treurnicht has indicated that his Conservatives will not try to force additional byelections as part of their campaign to defeat the reforms in a referendum for white voters to be held during the next year. [REDACTED]

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EAST GERMANY: Friction in the Peace Movement

Tension between young militants in the peace movement and senior Lutheran Church officials seems to be increasing as the regime puts pressure on the Church hierarchy. According to the US Embassy, party leader Honecker recently told a ranking Lutheran bishop that the Church should stop supporting peace activists. The Embassy also reports that, at an acrimonious meeting with peace activists recently, many provincial bishops complained of being under conflicting pressures from government officials and militants. As a result, the Church leadership postponed for one month a peace workshop that had been scheduled for next month in East Berlin. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The Church will be more cautious, but it will not abandon the peace movement. Lutheran leaders recognize that the renewed vitality of the Church depends upon their remaining responsive to the concerns of young people. Although the regime will continue working to split the peace movement, its efforts probably will fail. Most peace activists will abide by the wishes of cautious Church leaders rather than risk destruction of the movement. [REDACTED]

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
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Special Analysis

ISRAEL-LEBANON: Tel Aviv's Options

The Israelis are skeptical about Syria's willingness to accept any agreement on troop withdrawals from Lebanon reached by Israel, Lebanon, and the US. If Syria balks, most senior Israeli officials—including leaders of the Labor Party—will urge Prime Minister Begin to order a unilateral withdrawal of Israeli forces from most of the positions they currently occupy in Lebanon to an area approximating the 40- to 45-kilometer security zone that Tel Aviv demands. Such a move probably would increase domestic uneasiness over the government's policies on Lebanon, but most Israelis would be likely to support Begin.

Many Israelis suspect that Syria sees its interests in Lebanon as so important that Damascus cannot accept any agreement requiring withdrawal of its troops. Most also doubt that the US and such moderate Arab states as Saudi Arabia have sufficient leverage to force Syria to accept an agreement it does not like.

Moreover, Tel Aviv suspects that Moscow may be urging Damascus to reject any US-arranged agreement.

Israel's acceptance of the accord with Lebanon is contingent on Syrian and PLO withdrawal. If Damascus were to continue to reject the proposed arrangement or were to make unacceptable demands, Begin probably would yield to pressure in his cabinet for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal to positions within the security zone. In addition, Major Haddad's militia and other Israeli-sponsored forces in southern Lebanon would be expanded, allowing Israel to reduce its troop strength in Lebanon.

Support for a Unilateral Move

The proposal for a unilateral withdrawal already has been endorsed publicly by at least four cabinet members. Three of them serve on the influential Ministerial Defense Committee, which probably will make the ultimate decision. Labor Party leaders Peres and Rabin also have expressed support for the proposal.

A unilateral withdrawal could cause Begin some political problems. It would be a tacit admission by the government that the

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far-reaching political goals outlined shortly after the invasion last year have proved unattainable. []

Nevertheless, public opinion polls indicate that most Israelis would reluctantly support such a move. Polls taken last month show that, while 93 percent favor withdrawal from Lebanon, 70 percent want satisfactory security arrangements in place before withdrawal. More than 30 percent specifically cite Syrian withdrawal as a precondition for an Israeli pullout. []

Policy in Lebanon

If Tel Aviv decided on a partial unilateral withdrawal, its main goal in Lebanon would be to block the reemergence of a major PLO presence there that could threaten towns in northern Israel. The Israelis would be prepared to tolerate a Syrian presence in Lebanon equal to the current level, but they would hold Damascus responsible for Palestinian activities. []

A unilateral withdrawal from the Shuf region would remove Israeli troops from the path of the Phalange-Druze crossfire. It also would permit Israel to draw down its forces in Lebanon by at least 25 percent—to about 9,000 men—while continuing to hold strong defensive positions on the Sannin ridgeline and in the Bekaa Valley.

[]
Tel Aviv would want to work out a tacit agreement with Damascus to separate forces in the Bekaa Valley to lessen the possibility of a clash there. Damascus probably would be receptive, as long as Syrian troops could remain in control of the strategic Beirut-Damascus highway. Israel might even pull back its forces in the valley several kilometers, provided the Syrians agreed to remain in their current positions. []

Outlook

As long as Syrian and Israeli troops are in Lebanon, however, the possibility of a confrontation will remain. Moreover, if Damascus does not keep a tight rein on the PLO, Tel Aviv probably will authorize punitive strikes on Syrian and Palestinian positions in the Bekaa Valley. []

The danger will grow if large numbers of PLO fighters return to Lebanon. Damascus could retaliate by threatening Israeli positions in the Bekaa Valley, forcing Tel Aviv to send reinforcements there and increasing the chances of further clashes. []

A prolonged Israeli stay in southern Lebanon would call into question the future of the UN force, whose activities already are

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severely restricted. Under these circumstances, the contributing nations probably would be reluctant to renew the mandate after July, but the UN will seek to continue a presence to maintain a peacekeeping role. Lebanese President Gemayel almost certainly will ask the Multinational Force to extend its presence into the Shuf if Israel withdraws from there. [REDACTED]

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An Israeli pullback to the security zone and the continued presence of Syrian and PLO forces in northern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley would partition the country for the foreseeable future. That development would present a whole new set of problems to Gemayel's beleaguered government. [REDACTED]

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